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The absence ofany long-run relationship be-
tween inflation and the real rate of economic
growth in developed economies has been well
documented. The short-run positive correla-
tion between inflation and real economic
growth holds only so long as expectations of
future inflation lag behind actual inflation
rates. In the long run, the inflation/growth
tradeoff disappears because actual inflation
becomes fully anticipated.
Several developjng economies have
exhibited a negative correlation between long-
run average inflation and real economic
growth rates. One explanation may be financial
repression - institutional interest rates fixed
below their competitive, free-market
equilibrium levels by administrative fiat.
Under such circumstances, higher inflation
rates generally produce lower real (i.e., infla-
tion-adjusted) institutional rates - deposit,
loan and bond rates of interest.
In many developing economies, commercial
banks dominate the financial sector. Hence,
institutional interest rates consist, in the main,
of deposit rates offered to lenders/savers and
loan rates charged borrowers/investors. Finan-
cial savings are held as bank deposits - a
major component ofthe money stock. Money
is defined throughout this paper to include
savings, time and post office deposits, as well
as sight deposits andcurrency in circulation. 1
Higher inflation rates typically reduce real
deposit rates of interest. And lower deposit
rates tend to contract real money demand, i.e.,
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demand for money expressed in constant-
value terms. The decline in the real value of
the banking system's deposit liabilities must
be matched by a similar fall in the real value of
the banking system's assets (or by a corres-
ponding increase in bankcapital). The primary
asset of most banking systems is domestic
credit.
A fall in real money demand may affect the
price level in the same way as a rise in nominal
money supply. Provided the money market
clears, i.e., supply equals demand, inflation
can be expressed as the difference between
rates of change in nominal money supply and
real money demand. In contrast, a fall in real
money demand may not affect real economic
growth in the same way as a rise in nominal
money supply. Ceteris paribus, a decline in
real money demand reduces real credit supply,
but in the very short run, an increase in
nominal money supply has exactly the
opposite effect.
As inflation accelerates, and as real deposit
rates, real money demand and real credit sup-
ply all decline, the government may expropri-
ate an increasing proportion ofthe contracting
supply ofreal domestic credit to finance its ris-
ing deficit. Hence, funds for both working
capital and fixed investment are doubly
pinched. The fall in real money demand pro-
duces a credit crunch which, in turn, reduces
the real rate ofeconomic growth.
The long-run negative relationship between
inflation and real economic growth in finan-
cially repressed developing economies has
important implications for stabilization policy.
Policy-makers face the well-known dilemma:
lowering the rate of monetary expansion to
bring down inflation raises unemployment andreduces real economic growth in the short run.
However, financially repressed economies can
use both the money supply and nominal
interest rates as independent policy instru-
ments. While lowering the rate of monetary
expansion, they can raise nominal institutional
interest rates. The monetary deceleration has a
permanent inflation-reducing but temporary
depressing effect on real economic growth.
Raising nominal institutional interest rates
towards their competitive, free-market
equilibrium levels, however, has a temporary
inflation-reducing but permanent growth-
enhancing impact. In combination, monetary
deceleration with interest-rate increases could
lower inflation and, simultaneously, raise the
real rate of economic growth.
This paper tests the hypothesis that lowering
real deposit rates below competitive levels
increases inflation and, at the same time,
reduces real economic growth. Section I
examines the credit-availability mechanism.
Section II applies a small-scale model ofinfla-
tion and real economic growth to seven Pacific
Basin developing countries. Section III
analyzes alternative stabilization strategies for
financially repressed developing economies.
I. Financial Repression and the Credit Availability Effect
Low interest-rate policies found in a number
of developing economies are often part of a
broader policy of financial restriction. Such a
policy encourages financial intermediaries and
financial instruments from which the govern-
mentcan expropriate a large seigniorage, while
discouraging other entities. For example, the
system favors money and the banking system:
reserve requirements and obligatory holdings
of government bonds can be imposed to tap
this source of saving at zero- or low-interest
cost to the public sector. However, the system
suppresses private bond and equity markets -
through transaction taxes, stamp duties,
special tax rates on capital income, an uncon-
ducive legal framework, etc. - because seig-
niorage cannot be taken so easily from private
bonds and equities. The government can
impose interest-rate ceilings and foreign-
exchange controls to stifle competition with
government borrowing. It can then use high
reserve requirements to increase the flow of
resources to the public sector with minimum
effects on inflation and/or borrowing costs.
Nominal interest-rate ceilings established to
reduce competition under financially restric-
tive policies can be disruptive in the face ofan
inflationary shock. Just as U.S. deposit-rate
ceilings have caused serious disintermediation
in an environment ofrising inflation and free-
market interest rates, so developing
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economies' all-embracing interest-rate ceilings
on financial assets have caused violent
portfolio shifts from financial to tangible assets
(i.e., inflation hedges) in a situation of
accelerating inflation (Shaw, 1975). This type
of reaction magnifies the initial inflationary
shock. It also turns financial restriction into
financial repression, a condition in which the
financial sector contracts in real terms.
Typically, it seems, financial repression is
the unintended consequence of an inflexible
interest-rate system - established under
financial restriction, selective credit policies
and/or a bank cartel - in the face ofaccelerat-
ing inflation. Shaw's central proposition
(1973, pp. 3-4) is that financial repression -
indiscriminate "distortions of financial prices
including interest rates and foreign-exchange
rates" - reduces "the real rate ofgrowth and
the real size ofthe financial system relative to
nonfinancial magnitudes. In all cases this
strategy has stopped or gravely retarded the
development process." More recently, Cheng
(1980) has analyzed the phenomenon offinan-
cial repression and the process of financial
deepening in seven Pacific Basin developing
economies.
This paper considers the effects of financial
repression on credit availability in seven
Pacific Basin developing countries: Indonesia,
Korea, Malaysia, Philippines, Singapore,Taiwan and Thailand. The ratio of investment
to GNP increased in all these countries be-
tween the1960s and the 1970s. (Table O. Yet
in every case, except the Philippines, a higher
investment ratio was required just to sustain
the 19608' real economic growth rate. In other
words, incremental output/capital ratios fell.
Also, five countries (Indonesia, Korea,
Singapore, Taiwan and Thailand) showed a
negative relationship between real economic
growth and inflation. In fact, inflation acceler-
ated in all the sample countries except
Indonesia, where lower inflation was accom-
panied by substantially higher real economic
growth.
Until 1975, institutional interest rates were
determined, not competitively, but rather by a
bank cartel in Singapore and by administrative
fiat in the other six countries. With the world-
wide acceleration ofinflation in 1974, the real
12-month time-depomt rate declined in all the
sample countries - indeed, became substan-
tially negative in every case except Malaysia
(Table 2). Apart from Indonesia, real deposit
rates were considerably lower in the 1970s
than they had been in the 1960s. The lower
incremental output/capital ratios of the 1970s
may have been due to lower capacity utiliza-
tion, due to reduced credit availability for
working-capital needs.
The traditional link between credit and out-
put is through demand - the increase in credit
created by monetary expansion is accompanied
by an increase in demandwhich stimulates real
output. Within the past decade, Kapur(l976),
Keller (1980), Mathieson (1980), McKinnon
(1973) and Shaw (1973) have analyzed the
link between credit and real output through
the supply side. This Wicksellian view holds
that the availability of working capital deter-
mines,ceteris paribus, the volume ofproduc-
tion which can be financed. In particular, as
Keller (1980, p. 455) argues, "... production
expansion may depend, entirely or in part, on
credit availability and/or the cost ofcredit."
Evidently, this supply link between credit
availability and real economic growth springs
from the ratio ofcredit to output, or from the
real rather than the nominal volume ofcredit.
In the very short run, the real availability of
credit can be increased through an acceleration
in nominal domestic-credit expansion. Ceteris
paribus, this accelerated credit expansion is
accompanied - in fact, brought about - by
accelerated monetary expansion. Momen-
tarily, the money market does not clear -
money supply exceeds money demand. The
ensuing inflation erodes the real supply of
domestic credit as well as the real money stock.
If real money demand actually falls due to
higher inflation, then the new equilibrium
will, ceteris paribus, result in a lower ratio of
credit to output. 2
Conversely, a deceleration in domestic
creditexpansion decreases credit availability in
the very short run (Kapur, 1976; McKinnon,
Table 1
Investment, Growth and Inflation, 1962-81
Country Investment Incremental Real GNP Growth Inflation
Ratio Output/Capital Rate Rate
Ratio
1962-71 1972-81 1962-71 1972-81 1962·71 1972-81 1962·71 1972·81
Indonesia ILO 20.9 0.42 0.33 4.6 1
Korea 20.1 32.3 0.43 0.26 8.7 8.3 15.7 18.1
Malaysia 18.8 24.1 0.33 0.31 6.1 7.5 0.1 7.1
Philippines 21.1 25.6 0.23 0.24 4.8 6.2 6.9 12.1
Singapore 24.1 34.9 0.38 0.23 9.0 7.9 L5 5.4
Taiwan 20.9 29.5 0.44 0.26 9.1 7.7 4.0 10.3
Thailand 24.1 24.4 0.33 0.30 8.0 7.2 1.1 9.9
Note: Growth and inflation rates are continuously compounded.
Source: World Bank, World Tables (1980), and IMF estimates.
101973). With the consequent disequilibrium in
the money market, the real money stock is less
than real money demand. The subsequent
decrease in inflation may raise real money
demand, and the new equilibrium will exhibit
a higher ratio ofcredit to output. At this point,
credit availability is greater than it was before
the initial deceleration in credit expansion.
I am not concerned with the very short run,
for which this annual model is unsuitable,
but rather with the somewhat longer-run rela-
tionship between the rate ofnominal domestic
credit expansion and the ratio ofcredit to real
output. Faster expansion of money and
nominal credit raises the inflation rate. If the
nominal deposit rate is fixed, the ensuing
increase in expected inflation reduces the real
deposit rate of interest - and this in turn
reduces real money demand or decreases the
ratio of money to nominal GNP. The ratio of
domestic credit, DC, to nominal GNP, PY,
also falls. In this way, an acceleration in
nominal domestic credit and in money supply
reduces credit availability in real terms, i.e.,
DC/PY declines.
The Pacific Basin countries considered here
have placed little reliance on progressive
income-tax systems. This results in infla-
tion-inelastic real tax revenue due, in large
part, to lags in tax collection. For fighting infla-
tion, they tend to favor price controls on the
output of nationalized industries. As inflation
increases, nationalized industries tend to post
larger losses. The gap widens between conven-
tional tax receipts and public expenditure, and
this is financed by heavier reliance on seig-
niorage and the inflation tax. The government
extracts greater seigniorage by increasing the
proportion of domestic credit allocated to the
public sector, and thus reduces the ratio ofpri-
vate sector credit, DCp, to total domestic
credit, DC. The governmentlevies an inflation
tax by creating more money than the public
wishes to hold at the current level of prices.
This creates a double squeeze on credit avail-
able for private-sector working capital, i.e.,
DCplPY falls due to the decline in both DCI
PY and DCp/DC.
This credit-availability mechanism can be
tested for the 1961-77 period by regressing
three ratios - domestic credit to nominal
GNP, DCIPY; private-sector domestic credit
to total domestic credit, DCp/DC; and private-
sector domestic credit to nominal GNP, DCpl
PY - on the real rate ofinterest, dIP*, where
d is the continuously-compounded 12-month
time-deposit rate ofinterest and P* is the con-
tinuously-compounded expected inflation rate
(see Appendix). The ordinary least-squares
(OLS) estimates are (t values in parentheses):
Table 2
Real Deposit Rates of Interest, 1962-81
Indonesia Korea Malaysia Philippines Singapore Taiwan Thailand
1962-71 -65.3 3.6 5.7 0.5 3.9 6.6 5.6
1972 -10.4 0.2 5.4 -1.0 1.5 3.7 4.8
1973 -7.7 -1.8 2.2 -3.0 -1.4 -3.2 0.1
1974 -10.5 -4.5 1.6 -5.8 -3.0 -15.9 -3.0
1975 -5.8 -5.6 3.1 -4.1 -1.2 7.9 -1.4
1976 -3.2 -4.6 0.4 -2.9 0.8 6.5 -0.9
1977 -4.1 -2.9 -0.8 -1.9 2.6 3.4 -0.4
1978 -4.7 -2.8 -1.0 0.5 4.2 4.5 -0.1
1979 -9.9 -0.4 -1.4 2.0 4.9 -0.3 0.1
1980 -9.8 0.6 -0.4 1.9 3.2 -3.6 1.7
1981* -9.1 -3.0 -0.6 1.0 3.2 -1.4 1.1
1972-81 -7.5 -2.5 0.9 -1.3 1.5 0.2 0.2
*Nominal deposit rates are assumed to remain at their December 1980 levels throughout 1981.
Source: Deposit rates are from central-bank publications. Expected inflation is from polynomial distributed lags estimated
for each country in money-demand functions (Appendix).
11oc = -0.045 + 0.034(d-P*) + 0.007 z + 0.972 (OC) 0)
PY (-0.983) (2.683) 0.361) (35.348) PYt-1
K= 0.93
OCp = 0.095 + 0.048 (d-P*) + 0.913 (OCp)
DC (2.7i7) (0.542) (34.173) DC ,-i
K= 0.91
OCp = 1.099 + 0.847 (d-P*);
OC 07.408) (2.992)
K= 0.06
OCp = 0.014 + 0.025 (d-P*) + 1.005 (OCp) (4)
PY 0.125) (2.399) (52.344) PY (-i
K= 0.96




where z is the natural logarithm of per capita
real GNP. All ofthese estimates are consistent
with the credit-availability model presented in
this section. 3
II. Inflation and Real Economic Growth
Inflation in the Pacific Basin developing
economies, as elsewhere, is a monetary
phenomenon. Its analysis centers on the
market for money, whose market-clearing or
equilibrium condition can be expressed as the
difference between the rates of growth in per
capita nominal money supply and in real
money demand (a dot is b..ln):
where P is the continuously-compounded
rate of change in the GNP deflator, Ms is the
nominal money supply, N is population, and
md is the percapitademand for real money bal-
ances, i.e., (Md/P)!N. It seems reasonable to
expect that the market clearing or equilibrium
condition - short-run demand equal to supply
- would hold for this model because of the
preponderance of auction markets in all the
sample countries.
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The inflationary process in the sample coun-
tries can be properly understood only through
an analysis of the determinants of nominal
money supply and real money demand. The
money-supply mechanism takes different
forms in different countries, which precludes
any generalized analysis of the money-supply
process. I make one crucial assumption,
however - the feedback mechanisms from
inflation to money-supply growth occur with a
certain lag (see Aghevli and Khan's (1977)
study of Indonesia). Hence, the system is
recursive and changes in the nominal money
supply can be treated as if they were
exogenous for the purpose of estimating the
inflation function without biasing the estimate.
Real money demand, on the other hand, is
invariably determined by one or more price
(i.e., interest rate) variables and a budget con-
straint. Here, the price variable is the real de-
posit rate ofinterest, d-P*, and the budget con-straint is per capita real permanentGNP, y*. A economic growth, g (i.e., .6.lnGNPIP) - the
standard stock-adjustment process is added. dependent variable is determined in the
The money-demand function then is short run by the ratio of the actual to the
expressed in first-difference, semi-logarithmic expected price level, PIP*. If actual price
form: exceeds expected price, entrepreneurs
m d = alY* + a2.6. (d-P*) + a3mt.l· (7) interpret the difference to reflect a real
The rate ofchange in per capita real perma- increase in the demand for their products. In
nent income, y*, and the change in the response, they raise their rate of capacity
expected inflation rate, .6.P*, were both esti- utilization to increase output immediately, and
mated as polynomial distributed lags (see also invest more to increase that capacity.
Appendix). This procedure allows expecta- Expected inflation also affects short-run real
tions regarding future changes in inflation and economic growth through the real deposit rate
incomegrowth to be formed on the basis solely ofinterest, d-P*. An increase in expected infla-
of current and past values of the variables tion reduces the real deposit rate in all the
themselves. Still, given the dearth of sample countries, except Singapore since
econometric forecasting and low levels ofeco- 1975, because ofthe fixing ofnominal rates by
nomic education in the sample countries, this administrative decisions. In this situation,
seems reasonable. However, such expecta- adjustments to nominal rates invariably occur
tions are "rational" only in special circum- too little and too late to prevent a decline in
stances. real deposit rates. A fall in the real deposit rate
Equation (7) is substitutedinto equation (6) decreases real money demand - equation (8)
and the coefficient of MslN is no longer con- - and the resultant contraction in the real size
strained to one. The OLS estimate ofthis infla- ofthe banking system reduces the real supply
tion equation, with 1961-77 pooled time series ofdomestic credit.
data, is: Rising inflation typically enlarges public-
• (M). • sector deficits in developing countries due to
P = 0.930 N -0.927y* -0.986.6. (d-P*)-0.280m t_1 the lag in the collection oftax receipts (Tanzi,
(33.196) (-4.~59)(-10.849) (-4.303) 1977), to the erosion of the tax base, and to
It = 0.92 (8) price freezes on nationalized-industry pro-
The coefficients of the four variables in ducts. The government finances the larger
equation (8) all agree with a priori beliefs. The deficit by allocating a greater proportion of
coefficient ofthe rate ofchange in the nominal domestic credit flows to the public sector.
money supply is not significantly less than one. Indeed, the private sector is doubly con-
The implied long-run real-income elasticity of strained as the real supply of domestic credit
money demand is 1.286, a figure comparable declines and as the government extracts
to those produced directly in most demand increased seigniorage from the money supply.
estimates for broad money aggregates. The This credit squeeze dries up working-capital
implied long-run coefficient for the real de- funds and reduces the utilization of the exist-
posit rate of1.368 is also similar to coefficients ing capital stock. Hence., the real deposit rate
estimated in money-demand functions for affects positively the real rate of economic
other developing economies (Fry, 1978). growth, at least indirectly.
Finally, the coefficient ofthe lagged per capita In the very long run, real economic growth
real money stock indicates that over 70 percent depends on the volume and productivity of
of the adjustment to current expected real- investment, both of which are related
income and interest-rate values takes place positively to real institutional rates of interest
within the year. in the sample countries (Fry, 1980 and 1981).
The other equation of this model, equation However, for this shorter-run analysis, I
(9), below is a modified Phillips curve with the assume that investment raises productive
credit-availability effect added. The real rate of capacity - so moving the transformation fron-
13tier outwards - smoothly over time. For
industrial countries, the time trend of real
GNP may provide a reasonable proxy for
"normal" supply, the noncyclical component
determined solely by productive capacity -
but for most developing countries, annual
fluctuations in agricultural output are also
important Year-to-year changes in farm-out-
put growth determined largely by shifting
weather conditions represent exogenous
shifts in the production-possibility curve. Nor-
mal supply for this sample ofdeveloping coun-
tries thus may be defined as trend real GNP
plus the difference between actual and trend
real agricultural output
Normal real economic growth, g+, exerts a
positive effect on actual real economic growth,
g. However, above-average growth in
agricultural output may depress real growth
elsewhere because of the higher priority
accorded to the credit requirements of food-
procurement and agricultural price-support
programs, which are of course positively
related to farm-output growth. Hence, other
sectors would suffer a credit squeeze in real
terms whenever agriculture obtained a greater
share of the fixed real supply of domestic
credit
The effect of g+ on g would therefore be
expected to be positive but the coefficient of
g+ should be somewhat less than one, despite
the fact that on average g equals g+. Above-
average growth in agricultural output imposes
a credit squeeze on other sectors which
reduces their capacity-utilization rates and
hence their growth rates. The two-stage least-
squares (2SLS) estimate ofthis short-run eco-
nomic-growth equation for the 1961-77 period
is:4 •
g = 0.390g+ + 0.043 (J;-) + 0.049(d-P*).














The short-run Phillips curves show the standard positive
relationship between inflation and growth. This is caused
by price exceeding expected price in the short run as infla-
tion accelerates and expected inflation temporarily lags
behind. In the long run, expectations are realized. Ceteris
paribus. a higher inflation rate results in a lower real de-
posit rate ofinterest. In turn, real money demand and real
credit supply contract. The credit squeeze reduces the rate
of growth, so producing a negative relationship between
inflation and growth in the long run.
Equation (8) suggests that an acceleration in
nominal money growth raises the inflation
rate and so PIP*. This, in turn, seems to raise
growth in real GNP (equation (9», but
expected inflation meanwhile starts to rise. In
long-run equilibrium, P equals P* because
inflation is fully anticipated. In the long run,
therefore, inflation per se has no effect on real
economic growth. With d held constant,
however, the real credit-supply mechanism
leads to a negative relationship between infla-
tion and real economic growth in a financially
repressed economy (Figure l).5III. Stabilization Strategies for Financially Repressed Economies
Central banks of financially repressed
economies have at their disposal two indepen-
dent monetary-policy instruments - the
nominal money supply and the nominal de-
posit rate of interest. There is, in practice, an
upper bound to the deposit-rate instrument -
the free-market equilibrium rate in the
absence ofdiscriminatory taxation offinancial
intermediation (Fry, 1981). Since a higher real
deposit rate appears to reduce inflation and
raise real economic growth at the same time,
an optimal monetary policy would set the
nominal deposit rate at (or allow it to increase
to) its upper bound. The obvious approach
would be to abolish all institutional interest-
rate ceilings and dismantle any discriminatory
taxes. However, a minimum deposit rate
might be needed to force cartelized and
oligopolistic banking systems, found in all the
sample countries except Singapore, to achieve
the ideal competitive solution.
This analysis suggests that when the
authorities accelerate money-supply growth,
theyshould also change nominal interest rates
to maintain an appropriate level ofreal interest
rates and hence prevent a real credit squeeze.
As shown above, monetary acceleration by
itself tends temporarily to enhance or sustain
growth, but this is followed by a credit squeeze
which reduces growth. The real credit squeeze
can be avoided through appropriate interest-
rate policy designed to prevent administered
rates from falling further below their market-
equilibrium levels.
Interest-rate policy, by reducing inflation
and raising real economic growth can be a use-
ful instrument for stabilization purposes in
financially repressed Pacific Basin developing
countries. To illustrate, I simulate three
alternative stabilization policies for a com-
posite economy, using the model estimated in
Section II. The usual caveats apply about the
reliability ofthese forecasts.
The composite economy (somewhat resem-
bling Indonesia) starts off in a steady state,
with a 20-percent continuous rate of inflation
over the past decade and with expectations
15
realized regarding both expected inflation and
per capita real permanent income. The real de-
posit rate is -10 percent, the normal real eco-
nomic-growth rate is 7 percent, and the
population-growth rate is 2 percent. The lag
coefficients for expected inflation and per
capita real permanent income are: t-l, 0.4; t-2,
0.3; t-3, 0.2; t-4, 0.1. Equation (9) can then be
solved to yield an actual real economic-growth
rate of6.54 percent. and percapita real perma-
nent income growth, y"', of 4.54 percent. The
steady-state solution of equation (8) shows a
smooth increase of money-supply growth at
30.63 percent a year.
The first stabilization strategy reduces the
growth of the nominal money supply from
30.63 percent in the base year, year 0, to 17.14
percent in year 1and all subsequentyears. This
lowers the inflation rate in the new long-run
equilibrium to 7 percent and, hence, raises the
real deposit rate from -10 to +3 percent with
no change in the nominal deposit rate. The
new long-run equilibrium real-growth rate
increases from 6.54 to 7.18 percent (Table 3).
The second stabilization strategy again reduces
nominal money growth to 17.14 percent, but
also raises the real deposit rate (through de-
posit indexation) to 3 percent at the outset of
the program, i.e., in year 1. The third strategy
establishes the 3-percent real deposit rate, but
sets money growth at whatever rate is required
to maintain a constant real rate of economic
growth of 7.10 percent.
The main point to note in the simulation
results (Table 3) is that the first and second
strategies both produce a recession. Per capita
real GNP growth initially declines because
actual prices fall below expected prices. To
some extent, increased credit availability
offsets this expectations-reduction in supply.
Naturally, the credit availability effect is
stronger for the second strategy - real eco-
nomic growth does not fall so much and picks
up faster, despite the fact that higher real
money demand actually reduces the price
level. Both economic growth and inflation
converge to their new steady-state valuesTable 3
Simulation of Three Stabilization Strategies·
Year Strategy 1 Strategy 2 Strategy 3
Real Per Price Real Per Price Real Per Price Money
Capita GNP Level Capita GNP Level Capita GNP Level Supply
0 4.54 20.00 4.54 20.00 4.54 20.00 30.63
1 4.09 7.45 4.27 -5.37 5.10 17.85 42.10
2 4.34 2.94 4.96 4.23 5.10 17.01 31.73
3 4.73 Li6 5.20 6.74 5.10 16.04 28.00
4 5.15 1.51 5.27 7.20 5.10 14.99 26.15
5 5.45 3.34 5.26 7.14 5.10 13.92 24.81
6 5.56 6.07 5.19 7.00 5.10 12.92 23.65
7 5.51 8.08 5.17 6.95 5.10 11.90 22.51
8 5.36 9.02 5.17 6.96 5.10 10.90 21.39
9 5.21 8.99 5.18 6.98 5.10 9.90 20.29
10 5.09 8.33 5.18 7.00 5.10 8.92 19.20
00 5.18 7.00 5.18 7.00 5.18 7.00 17.14
·Continuously compounded percentage rates ofchange
faster under the second than under the first
strategy. The third strategy maintains a con-
stant per capita real growth rate somewhat
below its new steady-state level. This permits a
gradual and smooth reduction in the inflation
rate. However, because ofthe sharp, deflation-
ary increase in the real deposit rate in year 1,
nominal money growth must initially acceler-
ate. Thereafter, nominal money growth falls
gradually and smoothly in step with the declin-
ing inflation rate.
The strategies ofraising the real deposit rate
are more successful than the money-growth-
only strategy in achieving both higher real
growth and lower inflation. 6 However, once
the optimal real deposit rate has been fixed,
higher nominal money growth always
increases inflation as well as real economic
growth in the short run - but does not affect
the latter in the long..:run steady state. Conver-
sely, lower monetary growth reduces inflation
and real economic growth in the short run, but
again has no long-run influence on real eco-
nomic growth. Optimal policy with respect to
nominal money growth could be solved as a
dynamic control problem, given policymakers'
loss function.
The two strategies making active use of the
nominal deposit rate are clearly superior to the
strategy which relies solely on control over the
nominal money supply. And, ofcourse, other
policy instruments are also important, such as
fiscal, price, exchange-rate and foreign-trade
policies. Indeed, fiscal policy strongly in-
fluences money-supply growth in all the sam-
ple countries, with the possible exception of
Singapore. Again, appropriate price and
exchange-rate policies are crucial for the suc-
cess of any stabilization program. However,
their consideration is beyond the scope ofthis
paper, which was designed solely to examine
the role ofmonetary policy for stabilization in
financially repressed economies.
IV. Summary and Conclusions
The international economic environment
over the pastdecade has notbeen conducive to
stable economic growth. The oil shocks of
1973-74 and 1979-80 were accompanied by a
worldwide acceleration in inflation. Economies
with rigid nominal interest rates experienced
declining real rates of interest. In turn, real
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money demand fell, compounding the infla-
tionary forces. Declining real deposit rates also
reduced the real supply ofdomestic credit and
this credit squeeze lowered real rates of eco-
nomic growth.
This analysis provides an important policy
conclusion: flexible interest-rate policies infinancially repressed economies can be used to
counter inflationary shocks and accelerate the
real rate of economic growth. An increase in
the real deposit rate of interest towards its
competitive, free-market equilibrium level
raises real money demand, so reducing infla-
tionary pressures. At the same time, the
availability of credit increases in real terms.
Consequently, real economic growth rises,
which increases real money demand some
more. Inflation drops; the virtuous circle is
complete.
Appendix
The lag coefficients for per capita real per-
manent income and expected inflation were
obtained by applying polynomial distributed
lags to the rate of change in per capita real
GNP and to the rate of change in inflation in
the following first-difference semi-logarithmic
money-demand function:
m= a1y'" + a?P'" + a3m t_1 ; (A.I)
where m is per capita real money holdings.
Unconstrained first-, second- and third-
order polynomials were applied to the coeffi-
cients ofthe current and (up to six) past rates
of change in inflation and real per capita
income. Choices ofpolynomial degrees and lag
lengths were based on the pattern of the lag
coefficients, a nonnegativity criterion and the
R2S. Ceteris paribus, monotonically declining
or inverted U-shaped coefficient patterns were
preferred as being most consistent with an a
priori assumption about formation ofexpecta-
tions. For the same reason, sign changes were
inadmissible - the nonnegativity criterion.
"Satisfactory" results were obtained for
all the sample countries with first- or second-
order polynomials. The lag coefficient esti-
mates used for the pooled time-series analysis




Country Order t t-1 t-2 t-3 t-4 t-5 t-6
Indonesia 1 0.597 0.403
Korea 1 0.652 0.348
Malaysia 1 0.300 0.247 0.193 0.140 0.086 0.033
Philippines 1 0.338 0.662
Singapore 0 1.000
Taiwan 0 1.000
Thailand 2 0.594 0.159 0.247
Table A.2
Expected Inflation lag Coefficients
Country Order t-1 t-2 t-3 t-4 t-5 t-6
Indonesia 2 0.326 0.236 0.164 0.109 0.071 0.050 0.046
Korea 2 0.304 0.245 0.190 0.137 0.086 0.039
Malaysia 1 0.243 0.213 0.182 0.151 0.121 0.090
Philippines 2 0.187 0.234 0.240 0.206 0.133
Singapore 1 0.780 0.220
Taiwan 1 0.994 0.006
Thailand 2 0.334 0.240 0.166 0.113 0.080 0.068
17FOOTNOTES
1. The annual financial-stock figures used in this
paper, I.e., .the .money•stock, domestic•credit, •and
domestic credit to the private sector, are centered
monthly averages. End-of-month figures were
averaged first to provide mid-month estimates. Then
the 12 mid-month estimates were averagedJorthe
annual figures.
2. With perfectly elastic international capital flows,
an increase in domestic credit would, in the main, pro-
ducea decline in foreign-exchange reserves under a
fixed (including crawling peg) exchange-rate system.
Exchange-rate policy, not domestic credit policy, thus
would determine nominal money growth and inHation.
In •none .of the Pacific Basin developing countries,
with the recent exception Of Singapore, .are interna-
tional capital flows perfectly elastic. Indeed, capital
controls permitted the independent interest-rate
policies pursued by all these countries until 1975.
Singapore abolished its interest rate-setting bank
cartel in 1975 and thereafter dismantled such con-
trols. With capital-account controls at least partially
effective, an acceleration in domestic credit expan-
sion raises the rate of growth in the nominal money
supply while reducing foreign-exchange reserves.
3.· The coefficients ofthe laggeddependent variables
are biased upwards, since country dummy variables
were not used (see Fry 1978,p. 4139).
4. The instrumental variable technique is used to
deal With. both simultaneous-equation bias> and
measurement error in PIP". The instruments used in
the first stage were the rate of change in per capita
real permanent GNP, the real deposit rate of interest,
income terms of trade, the ratio of foreign exchange
receipts to GNP, the lagged ratios of national saving
investment to GNP, the lagged real deposit rate of
interest, the normal growth rate, the rate ofchange in
per capita nominal. money bal.ances, exchange-rate
overvaluation as measured by the ratio afthe blackl
free market to the official exchange rate, andthe real
exchange rate.
5. In the long run, financial repression also affects
the saving rate and the average efficiency of new
investment (Fry, 1980 and 1981).
6. How to control the money supply is a separate
issue beyond the scope of this paper. One prereq-
uisite for monetary control in all the sample countries
is undoubtedly fiscal discipline.
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